United Arab Emirates
Outside OPEC Since May 2026, With a Pipeline to the Gulf of Oman
Key Takeaways
- •The UAE left OPEC on May 1, 2026, after joining in 1967 (EIA Country Analysis Brief, July 2026).
- •Crude and condensate output averaged 3.8 million b/d in 2025 and fell from 4.0 million b/d at the start of 2026 to about 2.4 million b/d in March to May, when the Strait of Hormuz was effectively closed.
- •The 1.8 million b/d Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline reaches Fujairah outside Hormuz; a second 1.5 million b/d line is expected by 2027.
- •ADNOC reports production capacity of 4.85 million b/d, against EIA's 2025 estimate of 4.15 million b/d and the IEA's of about 4.3 million b/d.
- •About 99 percent of 2025 crude and condensate exports, some 3.2 million b/d, went to Asia and Oceania, led by Japan and China (Vortexa data cited by EIA).
Where the UAE stands in late 2026
The United Arab Emirates produced about 3.8 million barrels per day (b/d) of crude oil and condensate in 2025, was the world's ninth-largest producer of total liquids, and was the fourth-largest producer in OPEC. On May 1, 2026, it left the organization it had joined in 1967. Those facts come from the US Energy Information Administration's Country Analysis Brief: United Arab Emirates, July 2026 (checked October 2026), which also records the year's other shock: in March 2026 Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, and UAE crude and condensate output dropped from 4.0 million b/d at the start of the year to an estimated 2.4 million b/d from March through May.
Those two events pull in opposite directions. Leaving OPEC removes the quota that had kept part of the UAE's capacity idle; the strait closure removed most of the sea route that capacity would use. The UAE is better placed than its neighbours for the second problem, because it already pipes a large share of its crude to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, outside the strait. This page works through both.
A note on sources. EIA's July 2026 brief is the main reference, and it in turn draws on the OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin for reserves, on Vortexa tanker tracking for trade, and on Fitch Solutions for refinery capacity. Where a figure originates with ADNOC, the state oil company, it is attributed to ADNOC.
Output since 2016
EIA puts average UAE liquids production at almost 4.0 million b/d from 2016 to 2025. Crude and condensate rose to about 3.4 million b/d in 2019, were cut in 2020 under the April 2020 OPEC+ agreement, recovered as those cuts unwound, and reached 3.8 million b/d in 2025 after OPEC+ began phasing out its production cuts in April 2025.
| Period | Crude oil and condensate | Source note |
|---|---|---|
| 2019 | about 3.4 million b/d | EIA brief, July 2026 |
| 2025 | 3.8 million b/d | EIA brief, July 2026 |
| Start of 2026 | 4.0 million b/d | EIA brief, citing STEO June 2026 |
| March to May 2026 | about 2.4 million b/d (estimate) | EIA brief, citing STEO June 2026 |
The UAE no longer appears in the OPEC rows of EIA's Short-Term Energy Outlook tables after its exit; readers comparing OPEC totals before and after May 2026 should remove it from the earlier figures to get a like-for-like series. The guide to reading the EIA STEO explains how those table definitions change.
Capacity: three estimates, one target
How much the UAE could produce is a live question, because it determined the size of its OPEC+ quota disputes and now determines how much new oil may reach the market. EIA lists three numbers:
| Estimate | Production capacity |
|---|---|
| ADNOC, official (reported by Energy Intelligence) | 4.85 million b/d |
| International Energy Agency, latest | about 4.3 million b/d |
| EIA, 2025 | 4.15 million b/d |
| Government target, by 2027 | 5 million b/d |
The spread between ADNOC's figure and EIA's is 0.7 million b/d, larger than the entire output of some OPEC members. That gap is partly definition: a company figure may count capacity that can be reached within weeks, while agencies count what can be sustained. It is also why statements such as "the UAE can add a million barrels a day" should be read with the source attached. ADNOC plans capital spending of $150 billion from 2026 to 2030 and expansion at the Nasr, Upper Zakum, and Lower Zakum fields, according to the same brief.
Worked example: what the exit from OPEC could mean in volume
Using only the figures above, the arithmetic is simple and the uncertainty is wide.
- Low case: EIA's capacity estimate of 4.15 million b/d less 2025 output of 3.8 million b/d leaves about 0.35 million b/d of room.
- High case: ADNOC's 4.85 million b/d less 3.8 million b/d leaves about 1.05 million b/d.
- Target case: if the 5 million b/d target is met by 2027, the room grows to about 1.2 million b/d over 2025 output.
None of these is a forecast. Each assumes export routes are open, which in mid-2026 they were not, and each assumes the UAE chooses to use the capacity rather than hold it. The point of the exercise is the range: depending on whose capacity number is right, the exit is worth between a third of a million and more than a million barrels a day of potential supply.
The route around Hormuz
The UAE operates the 1.8 million b/d Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline, which carries Murban crude from fields inside the Gulf to the port of Fujairah just outside the strait. ADNOC is building a second line with capacity of 1.5 million b/d, expected to operate by 2027. EIA describes the UAE as one of the few Gulf producers that kept producing and exporting some crude during the 2026 closure, at a lower level than before.
Fujairah also holds an underground crude storage facility completed in 2023, reported at 42 million barrels and able to hold three grades. The UAE also leases strategic storage in South Korea, Japan, and India, though EIA notes the volumes in each are unclear.
A caveat from EIA's June 2025 analysis of the strait matters here: by 2024 the UAE was already using its pipeline more heavily for day-to-day exports, because refinery upgrades let it refine more heavy crude at home and export more light Murban. UAE crude and condensate crossing Hormuz in 2024 was 0.4 million b/d lower than in 2022. Heavier routine use left less spare pipeline capacity for an emergency (EIA Today in Energy, June 2025, checked October 2026).
Worked example: how much of the UAE's exports can avoid the strait?
Inputs: 2025 crude and condensate exports of about 3.2 million b/d, pipeline capacity of 1.8 million b/d today and 3.3 million b/d once the second line runs, and Fujairah storage of 42 million barrels.
- Today: 1.8 ÷ 3.2 = about 56 percent of 2025 exports could in principle move through Fujairah, if the pipeline were dedicated to export crude and fully available.
- With the second line: 3.3 ÷ 3.2 = slightly more than 100 percent of 2025 export volume, before any growth in output.
- Storage as a buffer: 42 million barrels ÷ 3.2 million b/d = about 13 days of 2025 exports, a short cushion rather than a long one.
The example explains why EIA's October 2026 outlook names new UAE bypass pipeline capacity in 2027 as one of the reasons it expects Gulf shut-ins to fall (EIA STEO, October 2026, global oil markets, checked October 2026). Once both lines run, the UAE's export volume is close to independent of the strait, something no other large Gulf producer can claim.
The crude grades the UAE sells
EIA lists selected UAE grades with data from S&P Global Platts. The two main export grades are Murban and Upper Zakum, and some UAE grades are part of the basket behind the Dubai/Oman benchmark.
| Grade | API gravity (degrees) | Sulfur (percent) |
|---|---|---|
| Das | 39.1 | 1.14 |
| Dubai | 30.4 | 2.13 |
| Murban | 40.0 | 0.77 |
| Umm Lulu | 38.9 | 0.70 |
| Upper Zakum | 33.2 | 2.09 |
Source: EIA brief, July 2026, Table 2, from Platts. Checked October 2026.
Murban's 40-degree gravity and low sulfur make it a light, relatively sweet crude by Gulf standards, and it is the grade the Fujairah pipeline carries. Upper Zakum is heavier and, at 2.09 percent sulfur, sour. The barrel-of-oil explainer shows how gravity and sulfur translate into refinery yields and price differentials.
Refining
As of January 2026 the UAE had five operating refineries with 1,249,000 b/d of total capacity. A sixth, the 74,000 b/d Umm al-Nar refinery, closed permanently in 2021.
| Refinery | Emirate | Owner | Capacity (thousand b/d) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ruwais | Abu Dhabi | ADNOC | 817 |
| Jebel Ali | Dubai | Emirates National Oil Company (ENOC) | 210 |
| VTTI Fujairah FZC-1 | Fujairah | VTTI | 120 |
| VTTI Fujairah FZC-2 | Fujairah | VTTI | 80 |
| Ecomar | Fujairah | Ecomar | 22 |
| Total | 1,249 |
Source: EIA brief, July 2026, Table 3, from Fitch Solutions. Checked October 2026.
Ruwais alone is about two-thirds of national capacity. Ecomar is pursuing an expansion that could nearly triple its Fujairah plant to 62,000 b/d, and ENOC has considered upgrading Jebel Ali to 250,000 b/d, a proposal EIA describes as still preliminary as of October 2025.
Trade in crude and products
Vortexa tanker data cited by EIA put UAE crude and condensate exports at about 3.1 million b/d on average from 2022 to 2025 and about 3.2 million b/d in 2025. In 2025 nearly all of it, 99 percent, went to Asia and Oceania. Japan took 778,000 b/d and China 700,000 b/d; the rest went to Europe, the United States, and Oman. The UAE also imported about 280,000 b/d of crude and condensate in 2025 for its own refineries, with Libya and Qatar the largest suppliers from their regions.
The products trade runs both ways. From 2019 to 2025 the UAE exported an average of 1.9 million b/d of refined products, 46 percent of it liquefied petroleum gas or naphtha, and imported about 1.0 million b/d, 82 percent of it diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, or fuel oil. The import list is dominated by transport and heating fuels and the export list by lighter feedstocks, which suggests the domestic refinery slate and domestic fuel demand do not line up, though EIA does not break the flows down by emirate or purpose.
Gas: large reserves, still a net importer
The UAE held an estimated 297 trillion cubic feet of proved natural gas reserves in 2025, per the OPEC bulletin cited by EIA, yet it buys more gas than it sells. Dry gas production averaged about 2.0 trillion cubic feet a year from 2015 to 2024 and consumption about 2.4 trillion. From 2015 to 2024 it exported an average of 264 billion cubic feet (Bcf) a year, all as LNG from the Das Island plant operating since the late 1970s, and imported about 717 Bcf a year, mostly by pipeline from Qatar.
That pipeline, the Dolphin line from Qatar's North Field to Taweelah, began commercial operation in 2006, runs about 230 miles, and has capacity of 3.2 Bcf a day. In 2024 the UAE also imported 42 Bcf of LNG, about 39 Bcf of it from Qatar and the rest from the United States. Its own LNG exports in 2024 went entirely to Asia and Oceania, with India taking 54 percent, Japan about 15 percent, and China about 14 percent.
ADNOC is building the Ruwais LNG plant, 461 Bcf a year, aimed at 2028, and plans to develop sour gas at the Hail and Ghasha concessions and unconventional gas at Ruwais Diyab, with a goal of becoming a net gas exporter by 2030. EIA notes the obstacles: rising domestic demand, and the cost of handling gas rich in hydrogen sulfide. World Bank data cited by EIA put flaring at about 48 Bcf in 2025, the 15th largest volume worldwide.
Power: why nuclear and solar matter to oil exports
Gas fuels most UAE electricity, but nuclear and solar supplied 28 percent of generation in 2024, up from less than 1 percent a decade earlier. The Barakah nuclear plant reached its full 5.6 gigawatts when its fourth unit came online in September 2024. Solar capacity is growing at the Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Park and through a 5.2 gigawatt solar and storage project Masdar began building in October 2025. Every gigawatt-hour not generated from gas reduces the gas the UAE must import from Qatar, which in turn supports its aim to keep more hydrocarbons for export.
The energy balance in one table
EIA's overview table for 2024 shows how lopsided the UAE's energy system is. Measured in quadrillion British thermal units (quads), the country produced far more energy than it used, and almost all of the surplus was oil.
| 2024 | Oil and other liquids | Natural gas | Coal | Nuclear | Renewables | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Primary energy production (quads) | 9.2 | 2.2 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 11.8 |
| Share of production | 78% | 19% | 0% | 3% | 0% | 100% |
| Share of primary consumption | 37% | 53% | 2% | 8% | 1% | 100% |
| Share of electricity generation | 1% | 71% | 0% | 23% | 5% | 100% |
Source: EIA brief, July 2026, Table 1, from EIA International Energy Statistics. Total primary consumption was 5.0 quads. Checked October 2026.
Worked example: how much of what the UAE produces leaves the country
Primary energy production of 11.8 quads against consumption of 5.0 quads leaves about 6.8 quads, or 58 percent of production, for net export in energy terms. Oil carries that surplus: oil was 78 percent of production but only 37 percent of consumption. Gas runs the other way, 19 percent of production and 53 percent of consumption, which is the energy-balance view of the net gas imports described above.
Two cautions apply. First, a quad-based balance ignores price: a quad of crude sold to Japan earns more than a quad of pipeline gas bought from Qatar under a long-term contract. Second, oil used in UAE refineries and then exported as products counts as domestic consumption at the refinery stage in some balances and as export in others, so the 58 percent figure is an order of magnitude, not a trade statistic. For barrels rather than energy units, use the Vortexa export figures in the trade section.
The table also explains the power-sector logic. Oil supplied just 1 percent of electricity in 2024, so the UAE, unlike Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, does not burn meaningful volumes of crude for power. Its domestic oil demand is mainly transport fuel and refinery feedstock, and the main lever for freeing more hydrocarbons for export is gas, through nuclear, solar, and new sour-gas fields.
Common misreadings
- "The UAE is in OPEC." Not since May 1, 2026, per EIA's July 2026 country brief, and EIA's October 2026 Short-Term Energy Outlook lists 11 OPEC members without the UAE. OPEC's own August 2026 Monthly Oil Market Report still showed a UAE row counted in its "Total OPEC" production table, so the two sources differ in how they present the group.
- "Capacity is 5 million b/d." That is the target for 2027. Current estimates range from 4.15 million b/d (EIA) to 4.85 million b/d (ADNOC).
- "The UAE is a gas exporter." It exports LNG but is a net importer of gas because domestic use exceeds production.
- "Fujairah means the UAE is unaffected by Hormuz." Output still fell to about 2.4 million b/d in March to May 2026; the pipeline limits the damage rather than preventing it.
Frequently asked questions
Did the UAE leave OPEC?
Yes, as reported by EIA. Its July 2026 country brief states that the UAE departed OPEC beginning on May 1, 2026; it had been a member since 1967 and was OPEC's fourth-largest producer. EIA's October 2026 Short-Term Energy Outlook (Table 3d, note c) defines OPEC as 11 members, without the UAE. OPEC's August 2026 Monthly Oil Market Report still counted the UAE in its production table, so check which definition a data source uses before comparing OPEC totals.
How much oil does the UAE produce?
About 3.8 million b/d of crude oil and condensate in 2025 by EIA's estimate, rising to 4.0 million b/d at the start of 2026 before the Hormuz closure cut it to about 2.4 million b/d from March through May.
What is Murban crude?
The UAE's main onshore export grade, light at 40.0 degrees API and about 0.77 percent sulfur. It is piped to Fujairah, outside the Strait of Hormuz, for export.
Can the UAE export oil if the Strait of Hormuz is closed?
Some of it. The 1.8 million b/d pipeline to Fujairah can carry a little over half of 2025 export volume, and a second 1.5 million b/d line expected in 2027 would raise bypass capacity to about the full 2025 export level.
Who buys UAE oil?
Asia, almost entirely. In 2025 Japan imported about 778,000 b/d and China about 700,000 b/d of UAE crude and condensate, according to Vortexa data cited by EIA.
Why does the UAE import natural gas?
Because domestic consumption, about 2.4 trillion cubic feet a year, has run ahead of production of about 2.0 trillion. Most imports arrive from Qatar through the Dolphin pipeline.
Related PetroEyes research on the UAE
The Gulf's exposure to the strait is laid out in the global supply chokepoints guide. For how OPEC's own reports treated the UAE before its exit, see the OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report guide, and for the group's quota mechanics, OPEC+ explained.
References
- U.S. Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Brief: United Arab Emirates, July 2026. https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/United_Arab_Emirates/uae.pdf (checked October 2026)
- EIA, "Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint," Today in Energy, June 2025. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=65504 (checked October 2026)
- EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026, Global Oil Markets. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/global_oil.php (checked October 2026)
- EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026, Table 3d, note (c), OPEC membership definition. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/tables/pdf/3dtab.pdf (checked October 2026)
- OPEC, Monthly Oil Market Report, August 2026, Table 5-7, read from a public copy because opec.org returned an automated-access challenge. https://egyptoil-gas.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/OPEC_MOMR_August_2026.pdf (checked October 2026)
