Kazakhstan
Tengiz Growth, One Export Pipeline, and the Risk at the Black Sea Terminal
Key Takeaways
- •Kazakhstan produced 75.7 million tonnes of oil and gas condensate in January to September 2025, 13.2 percent more than a year earlier, and 91.9 million tonnes in January to November, according to the Ministry of Energy (checked October 2026).
- •Oil exports reached 73.4 million tonnes in the first 11 months of 2025, already above the year's 70.5 million tonne export plan.
- •The Tengiz field's Future Growth Project is designed to add 12 million tonnes a year of crude; Tengizchevroil produced 16.6 million tonnes in the first half of 2026.
- •The Caspian Pipeline Consortium carried 55.5 million tonnes in the first nine months of 2025, the route for most Kazakh exports, and its Black Sea moorings were attacked in November 2025 and twice in July 2026.
- •The EIA estimates Kazakh liquids output fell to 1.75 million b/d in the first quarter of 2026 from 2.05 million b/d in the fourth quarter of 2025, before recovering to 2.24 million b/d in the second.
Kazakhstan in one paragraph
Kazakhstan is a landlocked producer whose oil output rose sharply in 2025 as a single project at a single field came on line, and whose exports depend on one pipeline running to one marine terminal in Russia. Government figures show oil and condensate production up 13 to 14 percent year on year through most of 2025. Company data from KazMunayGas (KMG) show that nearly all of that growth came from Tengiz. And the Caspian Pipeline Consortium's own press releases record a series of attacks and outages at its Black Sea terminal, which carries most Kazakh crude to market. The U.S. Energy Information Administration's (EIA) quarterly estimates show what that concentration costs when something goes wrong. This page draws on the Ministry of Energy as reported on the government's official site, KMG, Tengizchevroil (TCO), the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) and the EIA, all checked in October 2026. The Bureau of National Statistics site could not be reached for this review.
The 2025 production record
Kazakhstan reports oil in tonnes, not barrels. The Ministry of Energy presents results at government sessions, which the Prime Minister's office publishes.
| Period (2025) | Oil and condensate | Change vs same period 2024 | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| January to September | 75.7 million tonnes | +13.2% | Ministry of Energy, October 14, 2025 |
| January to November | 91.9 million tonnes | +14.1% | Ministry of Energy, December 17, 2025 |
| Full-year plan | 96.2 million tonnes | Ministry of Energy |
Working backwards from the ministry's percentages, January to September 2024 output was about 66.9 million tonnes (75.7 / 1.132), so the first nine months of 2025 added about 8.8 million tonnes. Gas output rose even faster, to 51.6 billion cubic metres in the first nine months (+16.7 percent) and 62.8 billion cubic metres by November, meeting the year's plan a month early.
Worked example: reading between two government updates
The ministry's two releases can be subtracted to see what happened in October and November 2025 alone.
| Measure | Jan to Sep (273 days) | Oct to Nov (61 days) |
|---|---|---|
| Production | 75.7 million tonnes, about 277,000 tonnes a day | 91.9 - 75.7 = 16.2 million tonnes, about 266,000 tonnes a day |
| Exports | 60.5 million tonnes, about 222,000 tonnes a day | 73.4 - 60.5 = 12.9 million tonnes, about 211,000 tonnes a day |
Both daily rates were about 4 to 5 percent lower in October and November than in the first nine months. The ministry's releases do not explain the difference, and two months is a short window, but it shows that the fourth-quarter softening the EIA estimates below was already visible in Kazakhstan's own cumulative figures, mostly before the November 29 attack on the CPC terminal.
Gas, LPG and transit
The ministry's November update also covers the gas side. Gas production reached 62.8 billion cubic metres in January to November 2025 (+16.7 percent), LPG output 2.8 million tonnes (+1.8 percent), and gas transit through Kazakhstan 64.5 billion cubic metres (+0.9 percent). Oil and gas chemical output was 567.6 thousand tonnes, up 12.2 percent, against a full-year plan of 590 thousand tonnes. Gas and oil growth ran at similar rates through the year, which is what would be expected if the same fields drove both, though the ministry does not break gas output down by field.
The same story in barrels per day
The EIA's October 2026 Short-Term Energy Outlook, Table 3c converts Kazakhstan into barrels per day of total petroleum liquids:
| Quarter | Total liquids (million b/d) |
|---|---|
| 2025 Q1 | 2.16 |
| 2025 Q2 | 2.18 |
| 2025 Q3 | 2.20 |
| 2025 Q4 | 2.05 |
| 2026 Q1 | 1.75 |
| 2026 Q2 | 2.24 |
| 2026 Q3 | 2.07 |
| 2025 average | 2.15 |
| 2026 average (forecast) | 2.08 |
| 2027 average (forecast) | 2.19 |
The fourth-quarter 2025 dip and the much sharper first-quarter 2026 drop line up with the damage to the CPC terminal described below. The EIA expects a full-year 2026 average below 2025 and a recovery in 2027. Kazakhstan is one of the non-OPEC participants in OPEC+, listed in the same EIA table; how that group sets targets is covered in OPEC+ explained.
Tengiz: where the growth came from
The field and its owners
Tengizchevroil was formed on April 6, 1993. Its partners are Chevron 50 percent, ExxonMobil Kazakhstan 25 percent, KazMunayGas 20 percent and Lukoil 5 percent. The field's first well produced oil on December 18, 1979, from the pre-salt formation at 4,045 to 4,095 metres, and TCO says annual crude output passed 25 million tonnes after 2009 (Tengizchevroil, company, checked October 2026).
The expansion
TCO's Future Growth Project and Wellhead Pressure Management Project (FGP-WPMP) is designed to raise crude production by 12 million tonnes. Milestones reported by TCO include early oil through a new metering station on November 4, 2021, the start of WPMP operations on April 25, 2024, and early incremental output from three metering station clusters of more than 13,000 tonnes a day, which TCO equates to about 100,000 barrels of crude a day (Tengizchevroil, projects, checked October 2026). In the first half of 2026, TCO reports crude production of 16.6 million tonnes, with about 2.67 billion cubic metres of sales gas, about 619,000 tonnes of liquefied petroleum gas and about 1.16 million tonnes of sulphur.
What KMG's numbers show
KMG reports production "net to KMG", meaning its ownership share of each asset (KMG nine-month 2025 operating results, checked October 2026).
| Asset (net to KMG, thousand tonnes) | 9M 2025 | 9M 2024 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tengiz | 6,093 | 4,296 | +41.8% |
| Kashagan | 2,259 | 2,306 | -2.0% |
| Karachaganak | 823 | 798 | +3.2% |
| Ozenmunaigas | 3,811 | 3,809 | +0.0% |
| Embamunaigas | 2,111 | 2,077 | +1.6% |
| Mangistaumunaigas | 2,300 | 2,302 | -0.1% |
| Other assets | 2,447 | 2,460 | -0.5% |
| Total | 19,843 | 18,047 | +10.0% |
Tengiz alone added 1,797 thousand tonnes to KMG's total, more than the whole company's increase of 1,796 thousand tonnes. Every other asset, taken together, was flat.
Worked example: how big Tengiz is in the national total
- KMG's net Tengiz production in 9M 2025: 6,093 thousand tonnes.
- KMG's share of TCO: 20 percent.
- Implied gross Tengiz output: 6,093 / 0.20 = about 30.5 million tonnes in nine months.
- National output in the same period: 75.7 million tonnes.
- Tengiz share: 30.5 / 75.7 = about 40 percent.
To turn that into barrels, use TCO's own equivalence of 13,000 tonnes to about 100,000 barrels, roughly 7.7 barrels per tonne. Over 273 days, 30.5 million tonnes is about 111,600 tonnes a day, or about 860,000 b/d. The same factor applied to TCO's first-half 2026 output of 16.6 million tonnes over 181 days gives about 705,000 b/d, lower than the 2025 rate, consistent with the export disruption early in 2026. Both barrel figures are illustrations built on TCO's conversion, not reported production rates; the barrel of oil explainer covers why the factor varies by crude.
What the project spends in Kazakhstan
TCO publishes its spending inside the country. It reports about $800 million spent on Kazakhstani goods and services and about $5.5 billion in direct payments to Kazakhstan in the first half of 2026, with more than 35,000 workers engaged on FGP-WPMP. On the project page it reports $1.3 billion spent on Kazakhstani goods and services in 2024 alone and more than $13.6 billion since the project began. TCO does not publish a total project cost on these pages, so this page does not quote one; the figure of $45 billion that appeared in an earlier version could not be confirmed and has been removed.
Kashagan and Karachaganak
The other two large fields did not grow. KMG's net Kashagan output fell 2.0 percent in 9M 2025 and Karachaganak rose 3.2 percent. Both are developed by consortia in which KMG is a partner. Because KMG's ownership shares in these two projects were not confirmed from a primary source in this review, this page does not gross up their net figures to field totals.
The mature fields operated by KMG's subsidiaries, Ozenmunaigas, Embamunaigas and Mangistaumunaigas, held production flat in 2025. Flat output from fields that have produced for decades takes continuous drilling and water injection, but these assets are not where Kazakhstan's growth will come from.
Exports: one pipeline, one terminal
The routes
KMG reports oil transportation by its two main channels. In 9M 2025 the CPC system carried 55,504 thousand tonnes in total (11,517 thousand tonnes counted as KMG's share), and KazTransOil, the domestic pipeline operator, carried 33,223 thousand tonnes. KazTransOil volumes include crude moving to Kazakh refineries as well as other export routes.
The Ministry of Energy reported oil exports of 60.5 million tonnes in 9M 2025 (+14.9 percent) and 73.4 million tonnes in the first 11 months (+16.1 percent), passing the year's 70.5 million tonne plan in November. Comparing the two sources, CPC's 55.5 million tonnes in nine months was equal to about 92 percent of Kazakhstan's 60.5 million tonnes of exports. That is a comparison of two totals, not a share calculated by either source: CPC throughput and the ministry's export figure are measured by different bodies and need not cover exactly the same barrels.
The CPC system
The CPC pipeline runs 1,511 km from Tengiz to a marine terminal on the Black Sea near Novorossiysk, where the first tanker loaded on October 13, 2001 (Caspian Pipeline Consortium, checked October 2026). A debottlenecking programme is designed to raise throughput to up to 83 million tonnes a year. The largest shareholders are the Russian Federation, with 24 percent held through Transneft as trustee, KazMunayGas with 19 percent and Chevron with 15 percent (CPC shareholders). Oil is loaded at sea through single point moorings (SPMs), buoys to which tankers connect offshore.
The terminal incident record, from CPC's own releases
| Date | Event reported by CPC |
|---|---|
| February 17, 2025 | UAV attack on the Kropotkinskaya pump station; back in operation May 23, 2025 |
| March 26, 2025 | SPM-1 and SPM-2 temporarily out of service during Russian safety inspections |
| August 29, 2025 | Oil spill during tanker loading from SPM-2 hoses; cleanup declared complete August 30 |
| November 29, 2025 | Attack by drone boats; SPM-2 "received significant damages" |
| January 25, 2026 | SPM-3 repairs completed |
| July 19, 2026 | UAV attack on two tankers loading at SPM-1 and SPM-2, carrying oil for Tengizchevroil and Kashagan shippers |
| July 27, 2026 | Lifting resumed with two tankers at the moorings |
| July 30, 2026 | Attack on a tanker loading for Tengizchevroil at SPM-3 |
Source: CPC press releases, 2025 and 2026, checked October 2026.
Worked example: what one damaged mooring means
The CPC releases refer to three moorings, SPM-1, SPM-2 and SPM-3. As a rough illustration, assume each can load a similar share of the terminal's tankers.
- With all three in service, the terminal has three loading points.
- With one out of service, it has two, about one third less loading capacity.
- If the pipeline keeps delivering crude at the rate the full terminal was sized for, shore storage absorbs the surplus until it is full, and then producers upstream have to cut.
The real constraint depends on mooring capacity, tanker scheduling, weather and storage, none of which CPC publishes in these releases, so this illustrates the mechanism rather than calculating lost barrels. CPC's December 30, 2025 release, for example, reports operations affected by adverse weather, a separate cause of the same kind of bottleneck.
Insight: concentration shows up in the quarterly data
A terminal with three moorings that loses one for weeks loses a large share of its loading capacity, and a field that cannot export must cut output once storage fills. The EIA's estimate for Kazakhstan fell from 2.20 million b/d in the third quarter of 2025 to 2.05 million b/d in the fourth, after the November 29 attack, and to 1.75 million b/d in the first quarter of 2026, a drop of about 450,000 b/d from the third-quarter level. Output recovered to 2.24 million b/d in the second quarter, after SPM-3 repairs, before falling again to 2.07 million b/d in the third quarter, when the July attacks occurred. For a producer this size, a single export point is a production constraint, not just a logistics detail. Part of the alternative is the trans-Caspian route to Azerbaijan, where the Sangachal terminal already receives Kazakh oil for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, but on the published figures that route is small next to CPC.
Refining at home
KMG's refining table for 9M 2025, net to KMG's ownership shares:
| Refinery | 9M 2025 (thousand tonnes) | Change vs 9M 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Atyrau | 4,417 | -0.1% |
| Pavlodar | 4,169 | +4.9% |
| Shymkent | 2,319 | +12.2% |
| Caspi Bitum | 253 | -14.6% |
| Kazakhstan subtotal | 11,159 | +3.7% |
| Petromidia and Vega, Romania | 4,611 | +37.1% |
The Ministry of Energy reported 11.6 million tonnes of petroleum products in 9M 2025, up 10.1 percent, against a year-end target of 13.7 million tonnes and 2024 output of 13.6 million tonnes. Domestic refining takes only a small share of Kazakh crude: KMG's share of Kazakh refinery runs was about 11.2 million tonnes in nine months, against 75.7 million tonnes produced nationally. Even allowing for the parts of each refinery KMG does not own, runs are a fraction of output. The country remains an exporter of crude first.
Limits of these figures
- Tonnes, not barrels. National statistics are in tonnes. Barrel conversions depend on crude density and should be labelled as estimates.
- Net versus gross. KMG reports its share of each asset. Its numbers must be grossed up before comparison with field or national totals, and that is only possible where the ownership share is confirmed.
- Crude plus condensate. The government's figure combines oil and gas condensate, so it is not directly comparable with crude-only figures used elsewhere.
- Pipeline throughput is not national exports. CPC reports what it carries, not what Kazakhstan exports, so the two should not be used interchangeably.
- Removed from earlier versions. The previous page described Tengiz, Kashagan and Karachaganak as "Africa's premier super-giants", which was wrong, and cited uranium reserve shares, a project cost, a 2060 carbon target and a hydrogen export corridor without primary sources. Those statements have been removed.
For how Brent, the benchmark for most crude sold into the Mediterranean and Europe, relates to US grades, see the WTI vs Brent spread explainer, and for world production rankings see the global oil production map.
Frequently asked questions
How much oil does Kazakhstan produce?
The Ministry of Energy reported 91.9 million tonnes of oil and condensate in January to November 2025, up 14.1 percent, with a full-year plan of 96.2 million tonnes. The EIA estimates total liquids at 2.15 million b/d for 2025.
Why did Kazakhstan's production grow so much in 2025?
Tengiz. KMG's share of Tengiz output rose 41.8 percent in the first nine months of 2025 as the Future Growth Project ramped up, while KMG's other assets were flat in total.
How does Kazakhstan export its oil?
Mainly through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium pipeline to a marine terminal on the Black Sea near Novorossiysk. CPC carried 55.5 million tonnes in the first nine months of 2025, against national exports of 60.5 million tonnes in the same period.
What happened at the CPC terminal?
CPC reported that a drone boat attack on November 29, 2025 significantly damaged single point mooring SPM-2, and that tankers at its moorings were attacked again on July 19 and July 30, 2026. The EIA's estimate of Kazakh output fell to 1.75 million b/d in the first quarter of 2026.
Who owns Tengizchevroil?
Chevron 50 percent, ExxonMobil Kazakhstan 25 percent, KazMunayGas 20 percent and Lukoil 5 percent, according to TCO.
References
- Government of Kazakhstan, Prime Minister's office. Ministry of Energy reports for January to September 2025 and January to November 2025. Checked October 2026.
- KazMunayGas. Operating results for nine months of 2025. Checked October 2026.
- Tengizchevroil. Company, Projects, home page first-half 2026 figures. Checked October 2026.
- Caspian Pipeline Consortium. Home page, Shareholders, press releases for 2025 and 2026. Checked October 2026.
- U.S. Energy Information Administration. Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026, Table 3c. Checked October 2026.
