Kuwait

Kuwait's position in one paragraph

Kuwait produced 2.49 million barrels per day (b/d) of crude oil in 2025 and 2.81 million b/d of total liquids, according to the US Energy Information Administration's Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026, Tables 3c and 3d (checked October 2026). In the second quarter of 2026 its crude output fell to 0.83 million b/d, two-thirds below the 2025 average, after Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz in March 2026. Kuwait sits at the head of the Gulf with every export terminal inside the strait and, unlike its two larger neighbours, no pipeline around it.

The rest of this page explains why that geography, together with a decade of investment in domestic refining and a slow-moving upstream programme, shapes almost every Kuwaiti oil statistic. Baseline structure comes from EIA's Country Analysis Brief: Kuwait, July 20, 2023 (checked October 2026); figures from it carry their own dates, because Kuwait publishes limited field-level data.

Production, quarter by quarter

Period	Crude oil (million b/d)	Total liquids (million b/d)
2025 Q1	2.43	2.75
2025 Q2	2.48	2.80
2025 Q3	2.49	2.81
2025 Q4	2.54	2.86
2025 average	2.49	2.81
2026 Q1	2.07	2.34
2026 Q2	0.83	0.93
2026 Q3	1.77	1.91

Source: EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026, Tables 3c and 3d. Recent quarters are EIA estimates. Checked October 2026.

The 2025 path, rising a little each quarter from 2.43 to 2.54 million b/d, tracks the gradual unwinding of OPEC+ cuts that began in April 2025. For comparison, EIA's 2023 brief records crude output of 2.7 million b/d in 2022, a voluntary cut of 128,000 b/d from May 2023 that took Kuwait's target below 2.6 million b/d, and an extension of those cuts through 2024.

The 2026 numbers are a different kind of event. The drop from 2.54 million b/d in the fourth quarter of 2025 to 0.83 million b/d six months later is about 1.7 million b/d, or 67 percent. Saudi Arabia, with its Red Sea pipeline, lost about 31 percent of crude output over the same comparison, and Iraq, with its northern route, about 64 percent from its 2025 average. Kuwait's loss was the largest in proportion because nothing else was available.

Why Kuwait has no bypass

EIA's June 2025 analysis of the strait is explicit: most of the oil that transits Hormuz has no alternative way out of the region, and the only bypass pipelines it identifies belong to Saudi Arabia (the East-West line to Yanbu) and the United Arab Emirates (the line to Fujairah) (EIA Today in Energy, June 2025, checked October 2026). Kuwait's crude and products leave from terminals on its own coast, inside the Gulf.

That makes Kuwait's export volume almost a direct function of shipping conditions in the strait. When EIA's October 2026 outlook says it expects most regional output to return to pre-conflict levels only by the end of the second quarter of 2027, and assumes Gulf shut-ins of about 4.5 million b/d in the fourth quarter of 2026, Kuwait is among the producers most exposed to that assumption (EIA STEO, October 2026, global oil markets, checked October 2026). Readers following the region's shipping risk should keep the global supply chokepoints guide alongside this page.

Fields: Burgan in the south, new barrels in the north

EIA's 2023 brief describes the southeastern fields, above all the legacy Burgan field, as the source of most Kuwaiti production and exports, a medium, sour crude. Since 2018 Kuwait has added two northern grades: a super light crude from the Jurassic gas and oil field, exported from mid-2018, and a heavy crude from the South Ratqa and Umm Naqa fields, exported from early 2020.

Capacity has moved the wrong way for a decade. EIA estimates that Kuwait's crude production capacity, including its share of the Neutral Zone, declined from nearly 3.2 million b/d in 2017 to below 2.8 million b/d in 2020, mostly because of decline at Burgan, and attributes the fall to insufficient investment, rising costs, regulatory hurdles, and political obstacles to approving projects. Kuwait Oil Company uses enhanced oil recovery and new gathering centres to slow the decline, and the official target is 4 million b/d of capacity by 2035.

The projects EIA listed in 2023, with the additions announced at the time:

Project	Added oil (thousand b/d)	Added gas (Bcf per year)	Announced start
Jurassic gas field, Phase 3 (EPF 4 and 5)	100	110	2024
Jurassic gas field, EPF 3 expansion	10	38	2024
Burgan GC-32 gathering facility	120	30	to be announced
Umm Niqa heavy oil expansion	30	none	2030
Lower Fars heavy oil, Phase 2	210	none	2040 (not sanctioned)
Durra gas field (Kuwait share)	42	183	to be announced

Source: EIA brief, July 2023, Table 2, compiled from MEES, Fitch Solutions, Rystad Energy, Reuters and Kuwait Oil Company. Announced targets, not delivered capacity.

Worked example: can the listed projects reach the 2035 target?

Starting from EIA's 2020 capacity estimate of just under 2.8 million b/d, the target of 4 million b/d needs about 1.2 million b/d of net additions.

• The oil additions in the table above sum to 512,000 b/d.
• Adding the projects EIA lists as already completed between 2018 and 2023 brings the brief's total to 792,000 b/d of announced additions.
• Even if every one of those were delivered and nothing declined, capacity would reach about 3.6 million b/d, about 0.4 million b/d short of the target.

In reality Burgan declines while new projects arrive, and EIA notes that political deadlock has delayed or cancelled projects for a decade. The exercise shows the scale of the gap; it is not a forecast.

The Neutral Zone shared with Saudi Arabia

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia split the output and revenue of the Partitioned Neutral Zone equally. After a five-year shutdown, production restarted in early 2020 at Wafra and Al-Khafji, and in 2022 averaged about 300,000 b/d in total, according to EIA. EIA's reserve figure for Kuwait includes half of the zone's reserves. When comparing Kuwaiti and Saudi production, check whether each figure includes the shared zone; the Saudi Arabia page uses the same convention.

The two countries also agreed in 2022 to develop the offshore Durra gas field together, aiming for 365 Bcf a year of gas and 84,000 b/d of condensate split between them. EIA notes the project could be delayed because Iran also claims the field lies in its waters.

Refining: the Al-Zour shift

Kuwait's most important change of the past decade is downstream. EIA's 2023 brief sets out the system:

Refinery	Owner	Capacity (thousand b/d)	Note
Mina Abdullah	Kuwait National Petroleum Corporation	454	Clean Fuels Project upgrade completed 2021
Mina Al-Ahmadi	Kuwait National Petroleum Corporation	346	Clean Fuels Project upgrade completed 2020
Al-Zour unit 1	Kuwait Integrated Petroleum Industries Company	205	Operational November 2022
Al-Zour unit 2	Kuwait Integrated Petroleum Industries Company	205	Operational March 2023
Al-Zour unit 3	Kuwait Integrated Petroleum Industries Company	205	Expected second half of 2023
Total		1,415

Source: EIA brief, July 2023, Table 3, from Oil and Gas Journal, FACTS Global Energy and MEES. Owners as reported there. Checked October 2026.

As of May 2023 Kuwait could process 1.2 million b/d from its three refineries, and EIA expected the last Al-Zour unit to lift that to about 1.4 million b/d. Al-Zour also produces large volumes of low-sulfur fuel oil, which Kuwait planned to burn in power plants when international gas prices were high.

Worked example: refining capacity against crude output

Using EIA's 1,415,000 b/d refining total and EIA's crude estimates:

1. Against 2025 output: 1.415 ÷ 2.49 = about 57 percent. If the refineries ran full, more than half of Kuwait's crude would be processed at home rather than exported as crude.
2. Against 2022 output: 1.415 ÷ 2.7 = about 52 percent, before the last Al-Zour unit was complete.
3. Against second-quarter 2026 output: 1.415 ÷ 0.83 = about 170 percent. During the worst of the disruption, Kuwait's refining capacity exceeded its crude production.

The third line does not mean the refineries ran full in mid-2026; their products also need ships through Hormuz, and EIA does not publish Kuwaiti refinery runs. It does show why the 2026 shut-ins reduced crude exports more than total petroleum activity: a growing share of Kuwaiti crude now goes into domestic plants first. Refining economics at that scale depend on product margins, explained in the refinery crack spreads guide.

Where Kuwaiti oil goes

EIA reports crude and condensate exports holding around 1.9 million b/d from 2020, the large majority to Asia. China's share rose from about 9 percent in 2013 to 31 percent in 2022. Vietnam began buying in 2017, when its largest refinery, 35.1 percent owned by Kuwait Petroleum Corporation, started operating. The United States, which took 16 percent of Kuwaiti crude exports in 2013, took 1 percent in 2022 as US production grew.

Product exports rose to about 650,000 b/d in 2022 from 530,000 b/d in 2021, with Europe and East Africa buying more as Europe replaced Russian diesel. More than 90 percent of product exports were LPG, diesel, jet fuel, and naphtha. EIA expected crude exports to decline as Al-Zour took more crude and product exports to rise, which is the same shift the worked example above quantifies.

Gas, power, and burning oil at home

Kuwait holds about 63 trillion cubic feet of proved gas reserves (December 2022), and about 70 percent of its gas output in 2021 came with oil production. Production fell from 691 Bcf in 2019 to 664 Bcf in 2021 under OPEC+ cuts, because less oil means less associated gas. Consumption rose 52 percent between 2014 and 2022, and Kuwait became the largest LNG importer in the Middle East in 2021. Imports began in 2009 at a floating terminal at Mina Al-Ahmadi; the onshore Al-Zour regasification terminal opened in July 2021 with a second phase in February 2022, for total capacity of about 1,056 Bcf a year.

Gas rose from 32 percent of primary energy consumption in 2009 to 65 percent in 2021 as it displaced oil in power and industry. That is the main reason oil consumption fell from more than 520,000 b/d in 2009 to about 290,000 b/d in 2020, before recovering to 365,000 b/d in 2022. Even so, in 2021 oil, mostly fuel oil plus some directly burned crude, still generated about 38.5 percent of Kuwait's 71 terawatt-hours of electricity, with gas supplying the rest. Generation capacity was about 20 gigawatts in 2021, subsidised tariffs put Kuwait fifth in the world for electricity generation per person, and about 13 gigawatts of new plants had been proposed but delayed. The government's renewable target is 15 percent of power, about 4.5 gigawatts, by 2030, starting from the 70-megawatt first phase of the Al-Shagaya project opened in 2019.

Where the imported gas comes from

In 2022, about half of Kuwait's LNG came from regional suppliers, mainly Qatar; the UAE began sending cargoes in 2021, and the United States became a significant supplier after it began exporting LNG in 2016. Kuwait's first long-term contracts, with QatarEnergy and Shell, cover up to 288 Bcf a year for 15 years to supply Al-Zour. That number is worth setting against the terminal: 288 ÷ 1,056 is about 27 percent of regasification capacity under long-term contract, so most imports depend on spot or shorter-term purchases. LNG cargoes from Qatar and the UAE must also cross the strait, which means the 2026 closure hit Kuwait's gas supply as well as its oil exports.

A small electricity link with its neighbours

Kuwait is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council Interconnection Authority. The main line from Al-Zour to Saudi Arabia has 1.2 gigawatts of capacity, and EIA's 2023 brief reported a planned 1.8 gigawatt extension north to Iraq, scheduled at that time for 2025. Against roughly 20 gigawatts of domestic generating capacity, the link is a safety valve for summer peaks, not a substitute for new plants.

What to watch as exports recover

Four series will show whether Kuwait's oil system is back to its 2025 shape:

1. EIA's quarterly crude estimate. The 2025 average of 2.49 million b/d is the benchmark; the third quarter of 2026, at 1.77 million b/d, was still about 0.7 million b/d short.
2. Refinery runs at Al-Zour. If domestic refining recovers faster than crude exports, product exports to Europe and East Africa will rise before crude cargoes to Asia do.
3. Summer oil burn. Kuwait still generated about 38.5 percent of its power from oil in 2021. A hot summer with constrained LNG imports pushes more fuel oil and crude into power plants and less into export.
4. Upstream approvals. Progress on the Burgan gathering centre and the northern heavy oil projects decides whether capacity moves toward the 4 million b/d target or keeps eroding.

Oil and the public finances

EIA cites International Monetary Fund estimates that oil and gas provided about 57 percent of government revenue in fiscal year 2021 (April 2020 to March 2021), and petroleum about 78 percent of export revenue in 2021. The real value of Kuwait's oil exports was $98 billion in 2022, up from $68 billion (in 2022 dollars) in 2021. EIA also records frequent political turnover, including repeated dissolutions of parliament after the 2020 election and a suspension in April 2023, as a reason upstream reforms and power projects have stalled.

Limits of the Kuwaiti data

• Dated structure. EIA's Kuwait brief is from July 2023. The refinery and project tables describe plans as of then; confirm completion before treating any listed capacity as current.
• Shared-zone barrels. Kuwaiti production and reserve figures include half of the Neutral Zone. A source that leaves the zone out would show up to about 150,000 b/d less, half of the zone's 300,000 b/d in 2022.
• Crude versus liquids. EIA's total liquids figure for 2025, 2.81 million b/d, includes about 320,000 b/d of non-crude liquids. OPEC+ targets apply to crude only.
• Estimates in a disruption. The 2026 quarterly figures are EIA estimates built partly from tanker tracking. Treat the second-quarter number as approximate.

Frequently asked questions

How much oil does Kuwait produce?

EIA estimates 2.49 million b/d of crude oil in 2025 and 2.81 million b/d of total liquids. In 2026 crude output fell to 2.07 million b/d in the first quarter, 0.83 million b/d in the second, and 1.77 million b/d in the third.

Why was Kuwait hit so hard by the Hormuz closure?

Because all of its export terminals are inside the Gulf and it has no pipeline around the strait. EIA's analysis identifies bypass pipelines only in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

What is the Al-Zour refinery?

Kuwait's newest refinery, built in three units of about 205,000 b/d each, commissioned from November 2022. With it, EIA expected national refining capacity to reach about 1.4 million b/d.

How big are Kuwait's oil reserves?

EIA gives about 102 billion barrels of proved reserves at the end of 2022, including half of the Neutral Zone, around 6 percent of the world total.

Is Kuwait in OPEC?

Yes. Kuwait is a long-standing OPEC member subject to OPEC+ production agreements; the OPEC+ explainer covers how its targets are set.

Does Kuwait import natural gas?

Yes, as LNG. Kuwait was the Middle East's largest LNG importer in 2021, using the Al-Zour terminal, because demand for gas in power plants grew faster than domestic production.

Further reading on Kuwait

To see how OPEC reports Kuwaiti output each month, read the guide to the OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report. For Gulf supply alongside other regions, open the world oil production map.

References

1. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026, Tables 3c and 3d. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/tables/pdf/3dtab.pdf (checked October 2026)
2. EIA, Country Analysis Brief: Kuwait, July 20, 2023. https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/Kuwait/kuwait.pdf (checked October 2026)
3. EIA, "Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint," Today in Energy, June 2025. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=65504 (checked October 2026)
4. EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026, Global Oil Markets. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/global_oil.php (checked October 2026)
5. EIA, Country Analysis Brief: United Arab Emirates, July 2026 (date of the Hormuz closure). https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/United_Arab_Emirates/uae.pdf (checked October 2026)