Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia in one paragraph

Saudi Arabia produced an average of 9.33 million barrels per day (b/d) of crude oil in 2025 and 11.21 million b/d of total petroleum liquids, according to the US Energy Information Administration's Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026, Tables 3c and 3d (checked October 2026). In the second quarter of 2026 its crude output fell to 6.70 million b/d after Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz in March 2026. Output recovered only partly, to 7.48 million b/d, in the third quarter.

That fall is the clearest recent illustration of the Kingdom's position. In ordinary years Saudi Arabia is the producer that holds most of the world's idle capacity and decides, with its OPEC+ partners, how much of it to use. In 2026 the question changed from "how much will Riyadh choose to pump" to "how much can physically leave the country", and the answer depended largely on one pipeline across the Arabian Peninsula.

This page uses EIA estimates, Saudi Aramco's own 2025 results, and trade statistics from the General Authority for Statistics (GASTAT). Where a figure comes from an older EIA brief it carries that brief's date, because Saudi Arabia publishes far less field-level data than, for example, Norway or the United States.

Production and capacity, quarter by quarter

The EIA table below separates crude oil from total liquids. The difference, close to 1.9 million b/d in 2025, is mostly natural gas liquids and condensate, which are not counted against OPEC+ crude targets.

Period	Crude oil (million b/d)	Total liquids (million b/d)
2025 Q1	8.94	10.72
2025 Q2	9.21	11.04
2025 Q3	9.43	11.33
2025 Q4	9.75	11.75
2025 average	9.33	11.21
2026 Q1	9.17	10.96
2026 Q2	6.70	7.84
2026 Q3	7.48	8.78

Source: EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026, Table 3c (liquids) and Table 3d (crude). Recent quarters are EIA estimates. Checked October 2026.

Two things stand out. First, Saudi crude output rose every quarter of 2025, from 8.94 to 9.75 million b/d, as OPEC+ began phasing out its earlier cuts in April 2025. Second, the second-quarter 2026 drop of 3.05 million b/d from the fourth quarter of 2025 was not a quota decision. It was a logistics ceiling: the barrels existed, but the sea lane most of them normally use did not work.

What "spare capacity" meant in 2025, and what it meant in 2026

EIA does not publish a Saudi-only capacity line in the STEO, but it does publish a Middle East OPEC total. Surplus crude production capacity in the region averaged 3.36 million b/d in 2025, most of it in Saudi Arabia. In the second quarter of 2026 that figure was 0.00, and the region's crude production capacity itself was marked down from 22.90 million b/d in the first quarter of 2025 to 11.89 million b/d (EIA STEO Table 3d, October 2026, checked October 2026).

The arithmetic is easy to misread. In EIA's framework, capacity that cannot reach a buyer is not counted as usable capacity. When the strait closed, the wells and processing plants in eastern Saudi Arabia were intact, but their barrels had nowhere to go except domestic refineries, storage, and the East-West pipeline. EIA's unplanned outage line for OPEC rose from about 1 million b/d in 2025 to 10.73 million b/d in the second quarter of 2026, which is how the shut-ins appear in the table.

Readers who follow the OPEC+ quota system should treat 2026 as a break in the series. Quota compliance, baseline disputes, and voluntary cuts describe a market in which producers choose their output. For several months in 2026 the Gulf producers could not.

The route around Hormuz: the East-West pipeline

Saudi Aramco operates the 5 million b/d East-West crude oil pipeline from the Abqaiq processing centre near the Gulf to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea. EIA notes that Aramco temporarily raised its capacity to 7.0 million b/d in 2019 by converting natural gas liquids lines to carry crude (EIA Today in Energy, June 2025, checked October 2026).

Before 2026 the pipeline mattered mainly as insurance. In 2024 Aramco had already pushed more crude through it to avoid shipping disruption around the Bab al-Mandeb, the strait at the southern end of the Red Sea. EIA estimated that, across the Saudi and Emirati bypass pipelines combined, about 2.6 million b/d of unused capacity could be switched to avoid Hormuz in an emergency, because the lines do not normally run full.

In 2026 the insurance was claimed. EIA's October outlook estimates that, before attacks on the pipeline in September 2026, it was carrying more than 5.0 million b/d of exports to Yanbu. The attacks temporarily halted flows; the Brent spot price averaged $114 a barrel in September and reached $131 on September 15, and the pipeline was repaired and partly resumed flows on September 22 (EIA STEO, October 2026, global oil markets, checked October 2026). EIA also reports that Saudi Arabia increasingly used ship-to-ship transfers along Oman's coast to move crude back through the strait.

Worked example: how much Saudi oil can bypass the strait?

Take three EIA numbers: the pipeline's normal capacity of 5.0 million b/d, Saudi crude output of 9.33 million b/d in 2025, and the 5.5 million b/d of Saudi crude and condensate that crossed Hormuz in 2024.

1. Share of 2024 Saudi Hormuz flows the pipeline could replace: 5.0 ÷ 5.5 = about 91 percent, but only if the pipeline were empty beforehand. It was not: it already carried Red Sea exports and feedstock for western refineries, which is why EIA's emergency headroom estimate was much smaller.
2. Share of 2025 crude output the pipeline could carry: 5.0 ÷ 9.33 = about 54 percent.
3. Second-quarter 2026 output against the pipeline: 6.70 million b/d of crude against 5.0 million b/d of pipeline capacity leaves about 1.7 million b/d for domestic refining, storage, and whatever still left through the Gulf.

The example does not prove that the pipeline set the production level, because EIA does not publish a Saudi export split by route. It does show why second-quarter output landed near "pipeline plus home use" rather than far lower, and why an attack on that single line in September moved the world price by more than $20 a barrel within a month.

Abqaiq: the processing hub at the head of the pipeline

The pipeline starts at Abqaiq, which EIA describes as the world's largest crude oil processing and stabilization plant, with a capacity of 7 million b/d, about 7 percent of global crude production capacity at the time. On September 14, 2019, an attack damaged Abqaiq and the Khurais oil field. Brent and WTI recorded their largest single-day price increase in a decade on September 16. Three days after the attack, Aramco reported Abqaiq producing 2 million b/d and said it expected full capacity back by the end of September, while it drew on inventories to keep supplying customers (EIA Today in Energy, September 2019, checked October 2026).

The 2019 and 2026 episodes are different kinds of risk. In 2019 one facility was hit, and inventories plus fast repairs covered the gap within weeks. In 2026 the facilities worked but the sea lane did not. A reader comparing the two should not expect the same recovery speed: EIA's October 2026 outlook assumes shut-in Gulf production still averages about 4.5 million b/d in the fourth quarter of 2026 and that most regional output returns to pre-conflict levels only by the end of the second quarter of 2027.

Aramco's 2025 numbers

Saudi Aramco, majority owned by the state, published its 2025 results on March 10, 2026. Selected figures, from the company (Aramco full-year 2025 results release and Aramco at a glance, checked October 2026):

Item (2025)	Figure
Total hydrocarbon production	12.9 million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Total gas production	11.4 billion standard cubic feet per day
Adjusted net income	$104.7 billion
Free cash flow	$85.4 billion
Capital investment	$52.2 billion (2026 guidance: $50 to $55 billion)
Total shareholder distributions	$85.5 billion
Gearing at year end	3.8 percent
Employees at year end	76,664

Company-reported figures, attributed to Aramco as operator.

Two operational notes from the same release bear on future supply. The Marjan crude increment is on stream and water injection has started at the Berri increment, both offshore projects. Production has also started at Jafurah, the unconventional gas development, alongside the new Tanajib gas plant, and Aramco says it is on track to raise sales gas production capacity by about 80 percent by 2030 from 2021 levels.

The gas figure is not a side detail. Every unit of gas that replaces oil in Saudi power plants frees crude for export, which is the logic behind the whole gas programme.

Burning crude at home

Saudi Arabia is one of the few countries that still burns crude oil directly to make electricity, mostly in summer when air-conditioning load peaks. EIA's December 2021 executive summary, using data from the Joint Organisations Data Initiative (JODI), put direct crude burn at a 10-year low of 410,000 b/d in 2018, just over 420,000 b/d in 2019 and 2020, and 654,000 b/d from July through September 2020, against 545,000 b/d in the same months of 2019. Fuel oil demand reached a record 600,000 b/d in 2020. That year the power sector ran on natural gas for 61 percent of generation and on crude and oil products for 39 percent, and total petroleum consumption was 2.9 million b/d (EIA Country Analysis Executive Summary: Saudi Arabia, December 2, 2021, checked October 2026).

Those figures are five years old, and the gas programme has moved on since. They still explain a pattern visible in monthly data: Saudi exports tend to dip in the summer quarter even when production is flat, because more crude stays home. Regional detail sharpens the point. In 2019 the eastern region generated 97 percent of its power from gas and the central region 72 percent, while the western and southern regions relied almost entirely on liquids because gas pipelines from the eastern fields did not reach them.

Exports: where Saudi crude goes

EIA's 2021 summary, based on Global Trade Tracker data, put 2020 crude exports at about 6.6 million b/d, with Asia taking 77 percent, Europe 10 percent, the Americas 9 percent, Africa 3 percent, and other Middle East buyers 1 percent. Product exports were close to 900,000 b/d. For 2024, EIA's tanker-tracking analysis shows Saudi Arabia as the largest single source of crude through Hormuz, and estimates that 84 percent of all crude and condensate crossing the strait went to Asia, with China, India, Japan, and South Korea together taking 69 percent of Hormuz crude flows.

GASTAT's merchandise trade data add the value side. In the fourth quarter of 2025, petroleum was 67.5 percent of total Saudi goods exports, down from 70.4 percent a year earlier; in December 2025 the share was 67.4 percent, against 68.7 percent in December 2024. China was the top destination for all Saudi goods exports in the fourth quarter, at 13.1 percent, and Japan led in December alone, at 11.7 percent (GASTAT, Q4 2025 international trade release, February 25, 2026, checked October 2026). The falling oil share in late 2025 reflects growth in non-oil exports, especially re-exports, rather than lower oil sales: GASTAT reports petroleum export value up 3.5 percent year on year in the fourth quarter.

For a US reader, Saudi Arabia has become a small supplier. EIA's 2021 summary put US imports of Saudi petroleum at about 0.5 million b/d in 2020, and the trend continued down as Canadian supply grew; the US imports by country guide has the current table.

Reserves and gas

EIA's 2021 summary, citing the Oil & Gas Journal, put proved crude reserves at 259 billion barrels at the end of 2020, about 15 percent of the world total and the second largest of any country, and proved natural gas reserves, including the Neutral Zone, at 333 trillion cubic feet as of January 2021. Saudi Arabia did not import or export natural gas. Dry gas output passed 4 trillion cubic feet for the first time in 2020, and associated gas, more than 80 percent of production in 2016, was about half by 2020 as non-associated fields grew. Flaring was about 80 billion cubic feet, roughly 2 percent of dry gas output.

Saudi reserve figures are government-reported and not independently audited field by field, which is true of most Gulf producers. Treat the number as an order of magnitude: enough for several decades at current output under any reasonable assumption, but not a precise inventory.

The Neutral Zone with Kuwait

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait share the Partitioned Neutral Zone, whose output and revenue they split equally. Production restarted in early 2020 at the Wafra and Al-Khafji fields after a five-year shutdown and had reached an estimated 270,000 b/d by April 2021, per EIA's 2021 summary. EIA's Saudi capacity estimate of nearly 12 million b/d in that summary includes the Saudi half; reading the Kuwait page alongside this one avoids counting those barrels twice.

How the state takes its share

All hydrocarbon resources belong to the state, and the Ministry of Energy sets production policy. Aramco pays the government through royalties, income tax, and dividends, and because the state is by far the largest shareholder, the dividend line is a large part of the fiscal take. EIA's 2021 summary noted that petroleum accounted for nearly 70 percent of export value in 2020 and about 53 percent of government revenue. Aramco declared a base dividend of $21.89 billion for the fourth quarter of 2025 alone, which shows how directly the company's earnings feed the budget.

Common misreadings

• Crude versus liquids. Headlines that say "Saudi Arabia pumps 11 million barrels a day" usually mean total liquids. OPEC+ targets apply to crude, which was 9.33 million b/d in 2025.
• Capacity versus deliverability. The "nearly 12 million b/d" capacity figure in EIA's 2021 summary assumes open export routes. In 2026 EIA cut the region's effective capacity roughly in half because the strait was closed.
• Production versus exports. Summer crude burn, domestic refining, and storage all sit between the two. A flat production month with falling exports is normal in July and August.
• Old briefs. The EIA executive summary used here for consumption and reserves dates from December 2021; use it for structure, not for this year's levels.

Frequently asked questions

How much oil does Saudi Arabia produce?

EIA estimates 9.33 million b/d of crude oil and 11.21 million b/d of total liquids in 2025. In 2026 crude output dropped to 6.70 million b/d in the second quarter and 7.48 million b/d in the third, because exports through the Strait of Hormuz were disrupted.

Can Saudi Arabia export oil without the Strait of Hormuz?

Partly. The 5 million b/d East-West pipeline carries crude to Yanbu on the Red Sea, and EIA estimates it was moving more than 5.0 million b/d of exports in 2026 before attacks in September temporarily stopped it. That is a little over half of 2025 crude output.

Who buys Saudi oil?

Mostly Asia. EIA's 2020 estimate was 77 percent of crude exports to Asia, and for all goods exports GASTAT lists China as the top destination in the fourth quarter of 2025, at 13.1 percent of value.

How big are Saudi oil reserves?

EIA, citing the Oil & Gas Journal, gives 259 billion barrels of proved reserves at the end of 2020, about 15 percent of the world's total.

Why does Saudi Arabia burn oil for electricity?

Because the western and southern regions were not connected to the eastern gas network, and gas supply lagged demand. Direct crude burn averaged about 654,000 b/d in the third quarter of 2020. The Jafurah gas project and pipeline expansion aim to replace much of it.

Where can I read OPEC's own estimate of Saudi output?

In the production tables of OPEC's Monthly Oil Market Report, which show both secondary-source estimates and the figure Saudi Arabia reports directly. The guide to reading the MOMR explains the difference.

Next steps for Saudi Arabia research

For the shipping lanes that decide how much Gulf oil reaches buyers, read the global supply chokepoints guide. For how a Gulf disruption feeds through to benchmark prices, the WTI versus Brent spread explainer shows why Brent moves first. Country comparisons are on the world oil production map.

References

1. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026, Tables 3c and 3d. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/tables/pdf/3dtab.pdf (checked October 2026)
2. EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026, Global Oil Markets. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/global_oil.php (checked October 2026)
3. EIA, "Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint," Today in Energy, June 2025. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=65504 (checked October 2026)
4. EIA, Today in Energy, September 2019, on the Abqaiq and Khurais attack. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41413 (checked October 2026)
5. EIA, Country Analysis Executive Summary: Saudi Arabia, December 2, 2021. https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/Saudi_Arabia/saudi_arabia.pdf (checked October 2026)
6. Saudi Aramco, fourth quarter and full-year 2025 results, March 10, 2026. https://www.aramco.com/en/news-media/news/2026/fourth-quarter-and-full-year-press-release (checked October 2026)
7. Saudi Aramco, At a glance. https://www.aramco.com/en/about-us/at-a-glance (checked October 2026)
8. General Authority for Statistics (GASTAT), international trade release for December and Q4 2025, February 25, 2026. https://stats.gov.sa/en/w/news/168 (checked October 2026)